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“The delaying effect of financing constraints on investment” 
 
 
Abstract:  
We develop a simple model in which a firm considers a number of investment projects. 
Because of limited financial resources, the firm can undertake at most one project. In line with 
the literature on real options we stress features like irreversibility, uncertainty and the 
possibility to postpone the investment decision and argue that financing constraints tend to 
increase the value of waiting.  
 
JEL codes:  D81, D92 
 
Key words: financing constraints, irreversible investment, uncertainty.  
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Introduction 
 
The lack of unlimited financial means influences our decision making significantly, in 
all levels of society. Often firms or consumers cannot buy everything they would like, due to 
the presence of financial constraints. Financial constraints may force a consumer to decide 
whether to buy a new car or to replace the kitchen instead of doing both. But besides choosing 
between buying the car or the kitchen at this moment the consumer also has the possibility to 
wait with its investment. It is very well possible that the car brakes down next year and he or 
she will have to buy a new car then. The presence of uncertainty will lead to an incentive to 
postpone the investment.  
Examples in other fields are also numerous. In this paper we will focus on a firm’s 
investment decision. In our analysis an investment is irreversible. Once the firm has invested 
in a certain project, it will not be possible to recover the initial expenses and use these to start 
an alternative project later. Similarly, it will not be able to restart the same project at better 
terms later. Furthermore, the future va lue of the various projects is surrounded with 
uncertainty and there is the possibility for the firm to postpone its investment decision.. The 
real options approach predicts that the incentive to postpone the investment increases with the 
amount of uncertainty surrounding the future valuation of the project. Hence the higher the 
uncertainty the higher the probability the firm will suspend investing. These assumptions are 
standard in the real options approach advanced by Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  
We will make a distinction between a firm that does not face any binding financial 
constraints and can invest in all projects that are considered profitable, and a firm that can 
only undertake at most one project due to a binding financial constraint and therefore has to 
choose how to spend its money best. This last case is in line with the literature that stresses 
the role of capital market imperfections due to which some firms may face credit rationing 
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(Hubbard, 1998). This financial obstacle to investment decisions in combination with 
assumptions standard in the literature on irreversible investment under uncertainty has 
received very little attention so far. 1  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1 we briefly present the case where a firm 
decides upon the timing of investing its resources in one project. In section 2 we introduce the 
presence of a second project and allow for financial constraints. Next we discuss the more 
general case of N projects in section 3. Finally section 4 concludes. 
 
1.  One investment project 
 
In this section we present a stylized model that captures the main elements of the 
recent literature on investment under uncertainty (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Consider a 
firm that has an investment opportunity called project A. If the firm decides to invest in period 
1 the net return of the investment is equal to VA1. It is useful to note that we do not model the 
cost of investing explicitly in our model. In fact the net return defined by Vi
t , where i indicates 
a project and t denotes period t, should be interpreted as the value of the project minus the 
sunk cost of investing. The net present value rule suggests to invest as soon as VA1>0. 
However, the recent literature on investment argues that the value of VA
1 should be compared 
with the expected net present value the investment yields if the firm delays its decision. 
Suppose that the firm also has the option to start project A in period 2. Without loosing 
generality we abstract from discounting. Then if the firm invests in period 2 the net value of 
the project is equal to VA
2. If the firm invests in the first period, it is impossible to recover the 
initial sunk cost of investment and to restart the project in period 2. This precludes the firm 
                                              
1 Scarramozino (1997) deals with irreversible investment and finance constraints in the context of 
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from setting up the project at better terms in period 2 and to acquire the potentially larger 
value VA2, because the initial investment is irreversible. To capture the notion that future 
realizations are uncertain, we presume that VA
2 is a random variable which is uniformly 
distributed on the interval [ì-ó, ì+ó]. Both ì and ó are strictly positive. The parameter ì 
denotes the expected value of VA2. The variance of VA2 equals ó 2. Therefore, a higher ó 
implies a higher degree of uncertainty surrounding the future benefits of the project. 
Uncertainty may be due to discretionary tax and subsidy policies regarding investment by the 
government of the host countries. Macroeconomic conditions like inflation may also be a 
determinant of uncertainty and unforeseen events in this respect may force the Central Banks 
to change interest rates affecting the cost of investment and the demand for products.  
We assume it is not possible to postpone the investment decision even after period 2. 
Therefore, if the firm’s management has delayed the investment decision in period 1 it will 
undertake project A in period 2 if the realization of VA
2 exceeds zero. In case the firm does not 
invest in period 2 the investment option is foregone. We assume that ì<ó. This assumption 
implies that the probability that the firm does not implement project A in the second period is 
strictly positive, because in the worst case scenario VA
2 =  ì - ó  < 0. We believe this feature 
of the model to be realistic. The case where ì<ó is definitely more interesting than the 
alternative case, because then the expected value of the project in period 2 is always positive 
and equal to ì. As a consequence comparing the returns of period 1 and period two, VA
1 and ì 
respectively, does not allow a role for uncertainty. Therefore, we only consider the case where 
ì<ó. To decide whether the firm should invest in period 1 it calculates the expected value of 
the option to invest in the second period:  
(1) 
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incremental investment and estimates a Q-model. 
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We use the symbol E to facilitate the discussion in later parts of this paper. It is optimal to 
invest in period 1 if VA1>F(VA). Otherwise the firm will postpone the investment decision until 
period 2. In line with the real options literature our model indicates that the net present value 
rule is incorrect (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). In fact equation (1) shows that the net present 
value of the investment in period 1, VA1, should be strictly larger than zero to be willing to 
invest in period 1. Furthermore it can shown straightforwardly that the higher the uncertainty 
as measured by ó, the higher the value of delaying the investment: .0>¶
¶
s
E  This result 
indicates that higher uncertainty tends to depress investment. Various studies provide 
empirical support for this claim (see for instance Guiso and Parigi, 1999; Ghosal and 
Loungani, 2000). Finally, delaying the investment becomes more likely as the expected value 
of VA2 increases:   .0>¶
¶
m
E   
 
2. Two investment projects 
 
Suppose now that in addition to project A the firm has an alternative investment option 
called project B. If the firm chooses to invest in project B in period 1 this yields VB1. The net 
present value of project B in the second period is randomly distributed as well. To simplify 
our analysis we assume that VB2 is also uniformly distributed on the interval [ì-ó, ì+ó]. In 
addition we presume that VA2 and VB2 are independent. These assumptions affect the 
generality of our results. However, the main argument presented in the paper that the firm has 
an incentive to learn which project is the most profitable one holds in a more general setting 
as well.  
The objective of the paper is to provide insights concerning the role of financial 
constraints in determining investment in light of the real options approach. The importance of 
financing constraints has been well documented. Firms may face difficulties in acquiring 
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external financial resources like bank loans or equity because of an information asymmetry 
between the firm’s management and the bank concerning the profitability of investment 
opportunities. Alternatively the principals (i.e. holders of claims on the firm) cannot perfectly 
monitor the activities of their agent (i.e. the management team of the firm).2 Due to such 
capital market imperfections, firms may experience that a shortage of cash constraints 
investment if the terms at which bank loans can be obtained are unfavorable.  
Irreversibility is important in our model. Suppose that the firm would be able to 
recover the initial expenses of its investments. In that case the firm could invest its financial 
resources in project A in period 1 for instance. However, if project B turns out to be more 
profitable the firm could reverse its decision to implement project A and start project B 
instead. Irreversibility does not allow for this possibility. We will show that irreversibility 
implies that a firm has an incentive to wait investing in  a particular project, because the future 
returns of another competing project may be very promising.  Implicitly we also presume that 
the returns of a project implemented in period 1 are insufficient to provide the required funds 
to start another project in period 2 as well. The best way of thinking about this aspect of the 
model is that each project’s cash flow is spread over many periods.   
To simplify our analysis we assume that the firm is not able to acquire any additional 
external funds to finance investment. The financial resources of the firm may be used to start 
an investment project. If financial constraints are not binding the firm may choose to invest in 
both project A and B. In fact, the firm should apply the methodology depicted in section 1 to 
both projects separately, since the value of the firm is additive in the values of the two 
projects. This means that the firm will invest in project A in the first period if and only if VA1 
 F(VA), and consider its investment in the second period otherwise. The firm will undertake 
project B in period 1 if and only if VB1  F(VB) and decide on investment in the second period 
                                              
2 See Hubbard (1998) for an excellent review of this literature.  
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otherwise. Obviously the value F(VB) can be derived using the methodology described in the 
previous section. 
However, if the firm faces a financial constraint it has the possibility to undertake one 
project at most. The financial constraint implies that by investing in project A the firm gives 
up the option to invest in project B. The decision whether to invest in the first period depends 
on the expected value of the two investment projects A and B in the second period. Therefore 
we start solving the firm’s decision in the second period:  
 
invests in A if  VA
2  VB
2 and VA
2  0, 
(2) invests in B if   VB
2 > VA
2 and VB
2  0, 
does not invest if  VA2 < 0 and VB2 < 0. 
 
In figure 1 we show in which instances the firm invests in either project A, project B 
or abstains from investing in period 2. The horizontal axis denotes the possible realizations of 
VA2. The vertical axis depicts the values VB2 can assume. In the areas I and II (where VA2  VB2 
and VA
2  0) the firm selects project A. The firm prefers project B in the areas denoted by III 
and IV (where VB
2 > VA
2 and VB
2  0). The firm does not invest if VA
2 < 0 and VB
2 < 0 in 
which case areas V and VI are relevant. The presence of project B in addition to project A 
affects the expected net return from investing in period 2 for two reasons. First, project B 
allows the firm to obtain a higher return from investment in area III where the firm would 
have earned VA2 < VB2 if project B did not exist. Secondly, the possibility of selecting B allows 
the firm to invest in more instances (area IV). 
We assume that the firm cannot sell the investment option that it did not implement to 
another firm, because the option results from firm specific resources or capabilities that 
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cannot be imitated or transferred to other companies (see Barney, 1991). Therefore in the first 
period the expected value of the two investment projects is given by  (see the appendix): 
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Since we assume that ó>ì it can be shown after some straightforward calculations that  
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where E is defined in equation (1). To recall, the quantity E represents the critical value for 
each investment opportunity at which the firm is willing to undertake either project A or B in 
period 1 if the firm does not face a financial constraint. Equation (4) indicates that the 
presence of two investment opportunities in combination with a financial constraint raises the 
critical benchmark at which the firm finds it optimal to invest in the first period by more than 
33 percent. This is due to the fact that by investing in either A or B the firm gives up the 
opportunity to invest in the other project later, which may be undesirable because it may yield 
a favorable outcome in the future.  
 The results above suggest that the timing of investment by financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms will differ. Suppose that a population of firms exists in which each firm 
considers the same investment projects A and B. Firms that do not face a shortage of cash are 
more likely to start project A or B in the first period than financially constrained firms, 
because the critical value E at which these firms are willing to invest is lower than that of the 
constrained firms.  
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It can be shown that if the expected value of the future returns of the two projects, i.e. 
ì, increases that: 
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This result implies that the firm’s incentive to delay the investment decision increases with  a 
higher expected future return ì. The same holds if the parameter ó measuring the amount of 
uncertainty surrounding the projects increases: 
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Therefore, higher uncertainty tends to increase the incentive to postpone investing.  
 
3. N investment projects 
 
The above findings readily extent to the case where the financially constrained firm 
has the opportunity to choose one project out of N possibilities. Like in the previous section 
we assume that the future returns of project i denoted by Vi2 are identically and independently 
distributed on the interval [ì-ó, ì+ó]. In the second period the firm:  
(7) invests in project i if   Vi
2  Vj
2 and Vi
2  0, for i¹j, i,jÎ{1,...,N} 
does not invest if   Vi2 < 0  for all i, iÎ{1,...,N}. 
 
Using partial integration we show in the appendix that in the first period the expected value of 
these N projects equals 
(8)  F(VA ,…,V N)  = =ò ò Õòå
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After some straightforward but tedious calculations performed in the appendix we find for 
N=2 that the expression in equation (8) is equivalent to the one presented in equation (3).  
In the appendix it is shown that if the number of projects increases with one the change in 
the expected value of the projects equals: 
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. Furthermore, by using mathematical 
induction it is verified in the appendix that for all N1 it holds that 1
2
3
0 1 £
+< +N
N
 and 
1
2
1
0 1 £
+< +N
N
. This implies that the change in the expected value of the projects is positive 
when the number of projects increases.  
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Therefore, the critical value at which the firm is willing to invest increases with the number of 
projects. Loosely interpreted, financing constraints become tighter as N increases since the 
firm can only select one project. Therefore, the above result in equation (10) indicates that 
tighter financing constraints increase the value of waiting.  
If the number of projects increases to infinity the expected value of the projects 
becomes: 
(11) sm +=
¥®
),...,(lim NAN VVF  
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The result follows from the fact that all random variables Vi2 are identically and independently 
distributed on the interval [ì-ó, ì+ó]. If the number of projects increases to infinity then with 
probability one in the second period the value of one of these projects will be ì+ó, the 
maximum realization possible. 
We also find that the value of the investment projects increases with the expected future 
benefits of the projects: 
(12)   
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Since the three terms after the minus sign in the above equation are all larger than zero but 
smaller than 1, the sign of the derivative is positive, implying that the firm is willing to wait 
longer if the future prospects of the projects improve. Finally, as we show in the appendix 
higher uncertainty increases the value of the investment projects in the future as well: 
(13) 
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Hence, as uncertainty increases it becomes more likely that the firm will wait with the 
investment to see which of the N projects is the most fruitful one. 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
We have studied a model in which a firm has a number of potential investment 
projects. Due to financial constraints it can select only one of these projects. The firm decides 
to implement one of these projects as the immediate return of this particular project exceeds a 
certain critical value. This critical value increases if the number of potential projects becomes 
larger. The reason is that there exists an option value of waiting, because the decision to 
 13 
choose a particular project cannot be reversed. Therefore, waiting allows the firm to learn 
which project is the best one if future profitability is uncertain. The model employed in this 
paper is restrictive in a number of ways. First, we assume that the firm can only delay its 
investment decision one period. Second, the risk characteristics of all projects are identical. 
We conjecture that those features of the model do not affect the main insights we present in 
the paper. 
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Appendix  
Derivation equation (3) 
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It is straightforward to show that the above integral is equal to the expression in (3). 
 
Derivation equation (8) 
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Derivation that for N=2 equation (8) equals equation (3). 
Starting with equation (8), 
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 17 
Derivation of equation (9)  
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Derivation of equation (10) 
We need to show that for all N>1, 1
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Derivation of equation (13). 
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